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RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW-ARREST WITHOUT A WARRANT-INFORMER'S TIP IS PROB-
ABLE CAUSE-Defendant was arrested by a federal agent acting without a warrant
on the tip of a paid informer. A search of his person revealed two envelopes con-
taining heroin and a syringe. This evidence was introduced at his trial and he
was convicted under the federal narcotics law. Held: the arrest and search were not
illegal; conviction affirmed. Draper v. United States, 3 L ed 2d 327 (U.S. 1959).
This much is clear: If the arrest was legal, the search was legal. Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925). Conversely, if the arrest was illegal,
the search was "unreasonable" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
[United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948)] and the evidence it revealed was
not admissible in the federal courts. Weeks v. United States 232 US. 383 (1914).
The arrest must be judged by whether or not there was "probable cause" at the
time the arrest was made. The facts creating probable cause need not be legally
admissible evidenlce. Brinegar v. United States, 338 US. 160 (1949). But nothing
discovered during or after the arrest will validate it if probable cause did not
previously exist. United States v. Di Re, supra.
The only real issue is: What constitutes probable cause? This question has
assumed new importance in the wake of the Mallory decision. United States v.
Mallory, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). If prompt arraignment is to be the rule, we must
know what magistrates will demand before permitting police to hold their suspect.
The doctrinaire requirement is probable cause. Is the right to hold coextensive
with the right to arrest? No federal court seems to have distinguished the two,
but it is hard to believe that a commissioner would permit police to hold a suspect
on a tip like the one which sustained the arrest in the instant case. Should not the
quality of evidence necessary to arrest a suspect be different in those cases where the
arrest and search may be expected to yield immediate and substantial proof of guilt
or innocence than it is in those where the arrest is used to prevent a suspect's es-
cape? Confusion over the nature of "probable cause" may partially explain police
reaction to the Mallory decision. The term itself seems to have exhausted the
judicial imagination and its definition has been standardized over the last 200
years. Blackstone would not have been surprised by the court's definition in the
instant case. "Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the
arresting officer's knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy in-
formation are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in
the belief that an offense has been committed." Draper v. United States, supra,
at 332. A note in 46 Harvard Law Review on page 1307 attempts to distinguish
between probable cause to suspect and probable cause to believe, contending that
the former will sustain an arrest. The real problem survives that distinction.
The difficulty does not lie in the definition but in the fact that criminal
cases develop in myriad ways. Sometimes the crime and the criminal are identified
simultaneously. In other situations suspicion may gather around the criminal
gradually over a period of weeks or months. Judge Prertyman discusses this
problem in Trilling v. United States, [260 F. 2d 677, 697-698 (D.C. Cir. 1958)].
The facts are different in each case but the standard is immutable. Probable cause
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is immutable, but not precise. The issues here are similar to those in cases involving
proximate cause or the standard of the reasonably prudent man. Indeed, if certain
procedural problems were ignored, one might suggest that these too, are issues
which a jury is uniquely equipped to settle. The necessary evaluation of facts
seems to fall within its province. However, it has been consistently held that the
question is one of law to be decided by the courts. Poldo v; United States, 55 F.
2d 866 (9th Cir. 1932). Perhaps it was necessary to remove this responsibility
from the jury. In that forum zeal for conviction might outweigh more delicate
considerations.
The decision has been made. What is important now is recognition that our
system of stare decisis is not well adapted to the task assigned to it. Absolutely
essential nuances are lost completely in reported opinions so that cases which
appear to be identical demand different judgments. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's ex-
planation of the confusion in the due process cases is applicable to this situation.
"The real clue to the problem . . . is not to ask where the line is once and for
all to be drawn but to recognize that it is for the court to draw it by the gradual
and empiric process of 'inclusion and exclusion'." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,
27 (1949). Certain problems are inherent in such a process. The Supreme Court
docket is so badly crowded that authoritative decisions are necessarily scarce.
Furthermore, because of the double jeopardy doctrine appellate review of marginal
cases can be secured only by judgment against the defendant in the first instance.
This places the trial court in a serious dilemma if the law is to be perennially
unclear. It should be noted also that the three means by which an illegal arrest
may be challenged, habeas corpus, an action in tort, or an objection to the intro-
duction of evidence seized during the arrest, are not available or are impractical in
the great majority of instances so that the issues usually are not raised at all.
In the face of these problems a study of all the pertinent cases is badly needed
so that our concept of probable cause can be intensified by distillation.
It appears to be widely recognized that illegal arrests are commonplace today.
The very questionable round-up or dragnet has become an accepted practice.
Some assert that a liberal right to detain, question, and search is a necessary
adjunct to police activity in an urban- society. Such rights are granted by the
Uniform Arrest Act which has been adopted by Rhode Island, New Hampshire
and Delaware. See Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315 (1942).
New proposals are being drafted by the American Law Institute for its Model
Penal Code. Perhaps the policy questions which surround the problem of arrest
are better settled by legislators than by judges. In either case it is a dangerous
fact that the layers of society so insulate both forums from the impact of their
decisions that they are apt to be insensitive to the real threat of intrusion which is
involved. Whether right or wrong, Mr. Justice Whittaker wrote the opinion in
the instant case secure in the knowledge that he was unlikely to be either searched
or seized. As our population increases, those who are entrusted with responsibility
grown ever farther from intimate contact with those whom their decisions affect.
For this reason actions touching our citizens' historical immunity from police




TORTS-ATI'RACTIVE NUISANCE-KNOWLEDGE NOT IMPUTED FROM BRIEF
OWNERSHIP-A four year old boy wandered onto an unenclosed vacant lot. He
stumbled on some junk which was burning on the premises and was injured by the
fire. The property had been purchased by the defendant only 21 days before the
accident. The defendant's equipment was being moved to the premises, but busi-
ness was not commenced there until after the accident. The fire had not been
started by any of the defendant's employees, but there was evidence that they knew
that the lot was used as a dump by the city and by private individuals who set
fires there almost daily. The trial court charged the jury on the basis of imputed
knowledge of the condition by the defendant based on the lapse of time the
property had been in the defendant's possession. The jury returned a verdict in
favor of the infant plaintiff. Held, judgment reversed and remanded: the defendant
cannot be held for imputed knowledge of the condition created by a third party
unrelated to him but there are sufficient facts for the jury to find actual knowledge.
Simmel v. New Jersey Coop. Co., 143 A. 2d 521 (N. J. 1958).
It is a well recognized principle of law that an owner or possessor of land
owes no duty to a trespasser other than to refrain from wilful or wanton conduct.
However, an exception has evolved for trespassing infants known as the attractive
nuisance doctrine. Today all the states have adopted some form of this doctrine,
but its application varies considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Some courts
have restricted its effect to dangerous agencies such as high explosives or dilapi-
dated buildings. Trudo v. Lazarus, 116 Vt. 221, 73 A. 2d 306 (1950). Others have
applied the doctrine to any artificial or injurious condition where the owner can
foresee the presence of infant intruders and when there is an unreasonable risk in
the infants' being harmed. Republic Steel Corp. v. Tillery, 261 Ala. 34, 72 So. 2d
719 (1954). Before 1952 New Jersey maintained the dangerous agency theory,
but since then it has assigned liability where the presence of infants and their
consequential injury was reasonably foreseeable. Harris v. Mentres- Williams 11
N. J. 559, 95 A. 2d 338 (1953). At present the main consideration in New
Jersey is with the necessary precautions which must be taken by the owner or
possessor in order to safeguard the attraction. Diglio v. Jersey Central Power &
Light Co., 39 N. J. Super. 140, 120 A. 2d 650 (1956); Wytupeck v. Camden,
25 N. J. 450, 135 A. 2d 887 (1957). In the District of Columbia there is little
case law. The courts have been influenced by the invitation theory of an early case.
United Zinc & Chemical Company v. Van Britt, 258 U.S. 268 (1922). The infant
must be attracted to the premises by some artificial condition. Best v. District of
Columbia, 291 U.S. 411 (1934); Eastburn v. Leven, 72 App. D. C. 190, 113 F. 2d
176 (1940).
The problem of whether imputed knowledge is sufficient to create liability
seldom arises because the injurious condition is usually created by the owner or
his agents. Imputed knowledge becomes an issue only when a third party has
created the condition. However, the liability of the owner or possessor would
seem to exist when he has knowledge of the condition on the vacant lot created
by the third person. Kotowski v. Taylor, 1 Harr. 430, 114 At. 861 (Del. 1921).
The court in the instant case reached this conclusion by holding that not only does
such a result conform to the underlying rationale of the Restatement of Torts,
(Section 339) but also by defining "maintain" from the Restatement as "toleration
or sufference of, or acquiescence in" the acts of third parties.
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The obligation is not apparent where the owner or possessor has no actual
knowledge of the condition created by a third party. The court here considers
actual knowledge the sine qua non for liability since "toleration or sufference of,
or acquiescence in" acts of others necessitates actual knowledge. However, the
few cases on this point do not indicate a strong policy. McFarland, Jr., v. Martin
& Glover, 90 Pa. Super. Ct. 151 (1926); Cooper v. Overton, 102 Tenn. 211, 52
S.W. 183 (1899); Kotowski v. Taylor, 1 Harr. 430, 141 Ad. 861 (Del. 1921).
Where, in Cooper v. Overton, supra, there are regular inspections and the condi-
tion did not exist when last inspected, knowledge should not be imputed. But
Kotowski v. Taylor, supra, recognizes a possible flexible area where imputed
knowledge can be found if there is a long period of time during which the in-
jurious condition existed on the vacant lot. The case does not specify the length
of time which was present, but it was not sufficient to impute knowledge to the
owner. Twenty-one days of ownership as in the principal case may not be
enough to create imputed knowledge, but to require actual knowledge in all such
cases is equally harsh. Differences in degree can be resolved better through a jury's
verdict than by rules of law.
THOMAS A. KFFvR
TORTS-MALPRACTICE-SETILEMENT WITH FIRST TORTFEASOR NOT ABSO-
LUTE BAR TO CLAIM FOR DAMAGES FROM NEGLIGENT TR1ATMENT OF INJURIES--
Plaintiff claimed injuries resulting from the negligent treatment in New Jersey by
defendant doctors for injuries received in an earlier accident in Ohio. The plaintiff
had filed a previous action against the original tortfeasor and, after a mistrial, had
settled for $139,000, executing a release. Plaintiff argued that the release to the
first tortfeasor did not release the doctors. The trial court granted defendants'
motion for summary judgment. On appeal, held, summary judgment reversed and
remanded for trial. The Supreme Court of New Jersey stated that fact questions,
precluding summary judgment for defendants, were presented as to whether the
release had been intended to discharge defendants and as to whether plaintiff
has been fully compensated. Daily v. Somberg, 146 A. 2d 676 (N.J. 1958).
The cases in the different states are in conflict as to the effect to be given
a release of the original tortfeasor. One rule states that the release should not be
a bar unless there has been full compensation in fact for all injuries. Wheat v.
Carter, 79 N.H. 150, 106 Atd. 602 (1919). The true question, these courts say,
is whether the injured person has already been compensated for his original loss,
and not whether the one responsible for the original injury could also have been
liable for that loss. The other rule, and by far the majority rule, is stated in Smith
v. Mann, 184 Minn. 485, 239 N.W. 223 (1931) where the court refused to dis-
cuss compensation, and relies simply on the assumption that plaintiff had dis-
charged her whole cause of action. This latter case is followed in Benesh v. Garvais,
[221 Minn. 1, 20 N.W. 2d 532 (1945)] where the court quoted much from Mann
to the effect that such a release was conclusive of any action on the injury, including




The instances are few where doctors have been found liable under a theory
of malpractice as the instant case indicates may happen. Perhaps the judges in
these cases are impressed with the theoretical danger of double recovery, as well
as the practical consideration that they are not dealing with plaintiffs who have
had no recovery at all. See Tanner v. Espey, 128 Ohio St. 82, 190 N.E. 229 (1934);
Knight v. Strong, 101 Ohio App. 347, 140 N.E. 2d 9 (1955). Generally courts
have held that the release of one responsible for an injury constitutes a bar to an
action against a physician for his negligent treatment of the injury, at least in
the absence of a finding that the negligence of the physician produced an entirely
new injury. Harris v. Brian, 255 F. 2d 176 (10th Cit. 1958); see also Borden v.
Sneed, 291 S.W. 2d 485 (Tex. Cir. App. 1956), commenting inter alia that
forty-four states are in agreement with Texas. However, when courts discuss
"full compensation" and "independent and successive acts," [Ash v. Mortensen,
24 Cal. 2d 654, 150 P. 2d 876, 877 (1944)] we are put on guard that cases with
facts very similar to those cited above will turn out differently. Similar statements
and results are found in Dickow v. Cookinham, 123 Cal. App. 2d 81, 266 P. 2d 63,
67 ( 1954)-"The independent and successive acts of the motorist and the doctors
produced two separate injuries and gave rise to two distinct causes of action;"
see also Couillard v. Charles T. Miller Hospital, Inc., 92 N.W. 2d 96 (Minn. 1958)
"but if he has not received full satisfaction, or that which the law considers such,
he is not barred until he has received full satisfaction," where the Minnesota court
limited Smith v. Mann, supra, to instances where the malpractice was a known
injury at the time of the release. Aronovitch v. Levy, 238 Minn. 237, 56 N.W. 2d
570 (1953).
The court in the instant case seems to be implicitly adopting the minority
rule. Disposing of the vast majority of the cases on the ground that the accident
occurred in Ohio and the malpractice in New Jersey, the court quotes from the
Mortensen case, supra, stating that "the motorist and doctor were 'independent
rather than joint wrongdoers'." It further points out that the incidents differed
in "time and place of commission as well as in nature, producing separate in-
juries and gave rise to distinct causes of action." Daily v. Somberg, 146 A. 2d at
681. Terms such as joint wrongdoer, successive acts, and full satisfaction, when
used with the traditional concepts of proximate cause and intervening cause, will
enable the courts to screen effectively the risks they think physicians should bear.
RICHARD A. BRADLEY
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